Solved by verified expert:Hi I need summaries for each article/video below (200-300 words each)Ellen Ullman, “Outside of Time”Mia Consalvo, “Gaining advantage: How videogame players define and negotiate cheatingPierre Bourdieu, “How Can One be a Sports Fan?Daniel Kriess, “Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts, Peer Networks, and Formal Organization During the 2003–2004 Howard Dean Campaign—————Attached——————For these three articles/video, there might be limited resource online, but you could just write a summary or related facts of it.Howard Rheingold, “The Virtual Community”Masco, Joseph. “Life Underground: Building the Bunker Society.” Anthropology Now, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009, pp. 13–29. JSTOR, JSTOR, SensiblePrepper, director. Preppers Are Crazy. Youtube, 16 Mar. 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_AJljHYww8———————————————–Meanwhile, I attached my paper proposal and I need a thesis statement for that.And it’d be perfect if you can write the summary or conclude the readings somehow related to my proposal/thesis.Thank you very much.Documents I need:Summaries for 4 attached articles and 3 unattached ones (200-300 each)+One thesis statement according to my proposal attached.————————————————Proposal for the paper:The personality shift among Facebook users and its impact on digital communicationThis study seeks to establish the differences between the personality that Facebook users establish on the internet how it impacts digital communication. Facebook is a subculture of the wider social media culture. The following research questions will guide the study.Does the personality that one adopt on Facebook differ from real life?To what extent does it differ?Does one trust the personality of the other online users?How does this affect communication between Facebook users?Various researchers have reported a difference in personality adopted by Facebook users although there is little data to tie it to digital communication. For instance, a series of surveys by Lenhardt, Smith & Anderson (2015) showed that up to 42% of Facebook users adopt a synthetic personality.The study will follow a quantitative research method, and where Facebook users will be requested to fill out a survey hosted online.Data will be presented in form of percentages and graphs for ease of understanding and analysis.
kreiss___2009___developing_the____good_citizen____digital_artifacts__.pdf
ullman_outside_of_time.pdf
bourdieu_sports_fan.pdf
conalvo_games.pdf
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Journal of Information Technology & Politics
ISSN: 1933-1681 (Print) 1933-169X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/witp20
Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts,
Peer Networks, and Formal Organization During
the 2003–2004 Howard Dean Campaign
Daniel Kreiss
To cite this article: Daniel Kreiss (2009) Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts, Peer
Networks, and Formal Organization During the 2003–2004 Howard Dean Campaign, Journal of
Information Technology & Politics, 6:3-4, 281-297, DOI: 10.1080/19331680903035441
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/19331680903035441
Published online: 27 Jul 2009.
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Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 6:281–297, 2009
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1933-1681 print/1933-169X online
DOI: 10.1080/19331680903035441
WITP
Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts,
Peer Networks, and Formal Organization During
the 2003–2004 Howard Dean Campaign
Kreiss
Daniel Kreiss
ABSTRACT. The 2003-2004 Howard Dean campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination is
often heralded as the prototypical example of peer-driven politics. Building from an emerging body of
literature on the Dean campaign, through interviews with key staffers and a survey of public documents I complicate this view by analyzing the interplay between the formal campaign organization,
digital artifacts, and citizen networks. I demonstrate that from the earliest days of the primary the campaign developed strategies and innovative organizational practices for convening and harnessing citizen networks. Drawing on analytical perspectives that combine Foucauldian “governmentality” and
actor-network theory, I argue that this was facilitated through the deployment of a set of artifacts that
realized and leveraged “networked sociality.” Finally, I argue that while the Internet Division of the
campaign adopted many “postbureaucratic” practices, it was embedded in a formal organizational
hierarchy that shaped its technical work.
KEYWORDS. Actor-network theory, campaigns, democracy, Internet, open source politics,
organizations, peer production
On a warm August night in 2003, Governor
Howard Dean, frontrunner for the Democratic
presidential nomination, bounded up on stage in
New York City’s Bryant Park carrying a red
inflatable baseball bat. In the midst of a drive to
raise $1 million before the governor’s appearance, a comment on Blog For America suggested that, in recognition of their achievement,
Dean carry the bat as a reference to the online
graphic that showed donors their progress
towards the goal. For Dean’s Campaign Manager
Joe Trippi (2005, p. 8) this was a canonical
moment, symbolic of the fact that volunteers
and small donors had ownership over the
campaign through the use of new online
networked communications tools. Many academic accounts echo Trippi in emphasizing the
peer-to-peer processes that appeared to be driving the Dean campaign. For example, Henry
Jenkins (2006, p. 208) argues that “peer-to-peer
rather than one-to-many communication” characterized the campaign. Lawrence Lessig
(2003) argues that the Dean effort demonstrated
“yet another context into which open source
ideals can usefully migrate,” while Manuel
Castells (2007, p. 251) describes the campaign
as an example of “autonomous forms of political organizing.”
Daniel Kreiss is a Ph.D. candidate in Stanford University’s Department of Communication.
The author thanks the anonymous readers of the Journal of Information Technology & Politics; Fred
Turner, Nicholas Anstead, and David Karpf for detailed readings of earlier drafts of this article; and is
indebted to the insightful comments of the audience at the Politics: Web 2.0 conference hosted at University
of London, Royal Holloway, April 17–18, 2008.
Address correspondence to: Daniel Kreiss, Department of Communication, Building 120, 450 Serra
Mall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2050 (E-mail: dkreiss@stanford.edu).
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JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS
These characterizations in turn reflect paradigmatic theoretical perspectives that proceed
from and rework well-established theories of
collective action (Olson, 1965; Tarrow, 1998)
in positing how new communications technologies are fundamentally reshaping the problem
of “free riding” and the necessity of formal,
hierarchical organizations. Bimber, Flanagin, and
Stohl (2005, p. 381) argue that “self-organizing”
increasingly characterizes collective action in a
world with dramatically falling information
costs and routine “private-to-public boundary
spanning.” Meanwhile, similar to other formulations of networks as a distinct organizational
form (Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 1990),
Benkler’s (2002, 2006) influential theory of
“commons-based peer production” describes
voluntary, leveled, and communicatively reciprocal networked collaboration that is distinct
from both the firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson,
1975) and the market. This new form of largescale collective action is posited to have great
import for political practice, especially with
regard to the public sphere, and is made possible by “decentralized information gathering and
exchange” (Benkler, 2002, p. 375).
While these analytical approaches do not
entirely overlook the existence and persistence
of formal, hierarchical organizations in a
world suffused by networks, these structures
are generally understudied or assumed to be
taking on features of networks, given shifts in
the information environment. For example,
Benkler (2002, p. 391) acknowledges the role
of formal organizations in convening and
“harnessing” peer production, but there is a
general lack of attention to the ways this
occurs and the interactions between organizational forms. Indeed, much work on commonsbased peer production proceeds as if networks
are autonomous organizational entities. Meanwhile, a body of work on “postbureaucratic
organizations” (Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994)
posits that some formal organizations increasingly resemble networks. In the political
domain, Bimber (2003) argues that postbureaucracy is characterized by a flexible
structure, an acute orientation to changes in
the external environment, and a decline in formal roles as contracts between individuals,
collaborations, and partnerships take place
outside of the formal organization.
This study turns to the Howard Dean campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination to explore the relationship between digital
artifacts, formal campaign organizations, and
peer networks. Despite a rich body of theory on
collective action, empirical research on the
organizational structures and technical practices of electoral campaigns is surprisingly limited. Students of politics generally have little
purchase on the processes by which artifacts are
adopted by campaign organizations, and many
studies detailing how candidates use new media
(Bimber & Davis, 2003; Howard, 2006) were
conducted prior to the emergence of the socialtechnical practices that broadly characterize
“Web 2.0 environments” (Chadwick, 2009, p. 34).
Meanwhile, an emerging body of work finds
the Dean effort to be a rich research site, given
the campaign’s unprecedented adoption of network theory and Internet applications (Foot &
Schneider, 2006; Wiese & Gronbeck, 2005).
These studies undermine many accounts of the
campaign as a uniquely participatory, emergent, and decentralized phenomenon. For
example, Hindman (2005, 2008) demonstrates
how the campaign used the Internet to revolutionize the “backend” of institutionalized political practice: fundraising, volunteer recruitment,
and voter mobilization. In addition, a body of
work documents the limits of interactivity, lack
of substantive forms of citizen participation on
the campaign (Haas, 2006; Stromer-Galley &
Baker, 2006), and ongoing importance of
formal organizations and elite professionals in
collaborative, participatory campaign practices
(Hindman, 2007, p. 195).
In turn, a number of scholars have pointed to
the organizational complexity of the campaign.
Jett and Välikangas (2004, p. 3) characterize
the campaign as a form of “open source organizing” that is “a network in many respects, but
it also exhibits the fluidity of a market and the
goal-oriented discipline of a formal organization.” Taking a more meso-level view, in an
analysis that includes the Dean campaign,
Chadwick (2007, p. 14) draws from social
movement theory to argue that “digital network
repertoires” facilitate the creation of “hybrid”
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Kreiss
organizational forms that use “mobilization
strategies typically associated with parties,
interest groups, and new social movements.”
Each of these perspectives makes a valuable
contribution in providing an analytical framework for thinking about networked collective
action in a way that avoids overemphasizing
peer-to-peer processes while paying close
attention to the complexities of organizational
forms and practices.
This article extends this empirical work on
the Dean campaign and contributes to theoretical perspectives on networked politics by
closely detailing the campaign’s organizational and technical practices. Through openended interviews with key staffers and a survey
of public documents, including archived Web
pages, professional press articles, blog posts,
and first-hand accounts, especially Trippi’s
(2004) autobiographical The Revolution Will
Not Be Televised and Streeter and Teachout’s
(2007) edited collection Mousepads, Shoe
Leather, and Hope, this article proceeds in
three parts.1 I begin by discussing the strategy
behind the campaign’s uptake of networked
communications tools and argue that staffers
and consultants developed a novel set of practices that centered and thus leveraged the peerto-peer networks that emerged independently
of the campaign early in the primaries. Drawing from analytical perspectives that couple
Foucauldian governmentality and actornetwork theory, I next turn to analysis of the
innovative networked artifacts that realized
and structured digitally “networked sociality”
(Wittel, 2001) to further backend campaign
practices, detailing how campaign staffers’
version of the “good citizen” (Schudson,
1998) was technically and discursively produced. I then show how these practices were
shaped by, and in turn influenced, formal
organizational processes, especially as peer
networks served as resources for staffers
and advisors in internal organizational conflicts. In the process I argue that the case of the
Dean campaign suggests that collaborative
peer networks are structured by the demands
of an inter-organizational environment,
political institutions, and intra-organizational
processes.
283
CENTERING THE DEAN CAMPAIGN
By the late summer of 2003, Howard Dean,
former governor of Vermont, was at the top of
the polls for the Democratic presidential nomination despite entering the race as an outsider
candidate. To many close observers of politics,
Dean’s meteoric rise was fueled by new Internet applications including blogs and Meetup—a
Web site that facilitates offline gatherings—
that enabled citizens to self-organize. Trippi
(2003) even argued that the role of the formal
campaign organization was simply to “provide
the tools and some of the direction . . . and get
the hell out of the way when a big wave is
building on its own.” While this is a romantically democratic account, in reality these citizen networks were convened and harnessed for
backend labor through an innovative set of
organizational and technical practices honed by
the formal campaign organization. As Jerome
Armstrong (2006), an influential progressive
blogger who served as an advisor and consultant for the campaign, described their strategy:
Much has been said about the decentralized and emergent quality of the Howard
Dean campaign, and many people,
actions, and efforts did emerge with the
volition to join in word and deed; but from
the very beginning, from May and June of
2002, there was tactic encouragement of
the decentralized campaign, from the very
center.
Understanding how this strategy developed
is contingent upon the detailed consideration of
the socio-technical context within which the
2003–2004 primaries occurred. Political blogs,
while not new, had growing user-bases and
visibility by 2002, the time when potential candidates were making initial hires to staff their
nascent campaign organizations. Blogs served
as sites for Democratic Party activists to discuss
politics and candidates independently of the
formal campaigns, many of which lacked dedicated Web sites for presidential runs until the
fall and winter of 2002, and even then were
technically unsophisticated.2 The majority of
these online progressive party activists and
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JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS
bloggers were interested in and active promoters of Dean’s candidacy, becoming engaged
well before he formally announced his intention
to run for the nomination. This was, in part, a
result of Dean’s antiwar stance, which appealed
to the base of the party.
Not only did Dean’s independent online support outstrip that of the other candidates early in
the primary cycle, it also proved highly consequential with respect to identifying and taking
advantage of opportunities that were later leveraged by the campaign. During the summer of
2002, a network of blogs including MyDD, run
by Jerome Armstrong, and the volunteer-created
and administered Howard Dean 2004 (later
called Dean Nation) not only provided activists
with outlets to become engaged in Dean’s
candidacy in the absence of a fully functional
formal campaign organization, these efforts
also served as Dean’s de facto Internet presence. For example, when William Finkel of
Meetup was contacting all the Democratic primary candidates in early 2003 to offer them formalized use of the online application, he wrote
to the volunteer administrator of Howard Dean
2004, Aziz Poonawalla. After featuring a link
on the site, Howard Dean 2004 drove the initial
use and growth of Meetup among the campaign’s supporters. Armstrong (2007, pg. 47)
eventually put Finkel in touch with Trippi and
convinced the campaign to adopt it as an organizing tool, making Dean the only candidate
that responded to the firm’s initial inquiry.
Meetup went on to become the organizational
core of Dean’s online effort and a significant
fundraising vehicle. Just as importantly, it was
a symbol of the campaign’s technological proficiency for the political press. By the summer of
2003, Meetup supporters even served as a transparent and verifiable metric for political journalists to judge the strength of primary
campaigns.
These blogs were also hubs of online activity
that the campaign strove to incorporate to garner financial and human resources. After Trippi
formally joined the candidate as Campaign
Manager in January 2003, he sought to provide
coordinated, routine direction to these volunteer
efforts by convening them through the networked technologies of the formal campaign
organization. Armstrong recalls a meeting in
early 2003 with his consulting partner Markos
Moulitsas Zúnigu, founder of the blog Daily Kos,
and Trippi, during which they crafted the broad
contours of the campaign’s Internet strategy:
The three of us discussed what we
believed could be brought inside the campaign from the ongoing decentralized
effort—the gist of “the revolution” being
to launch an official national campaign
blog, where the online community, fundraising, and organizing efforts could be
centralized. . . . (Armstrong, 2007, p. 45)
This strategy was implemented through the
campaign’s Internet Division, which crafted
novel organizational practices and deployed
networked artifacts including blogs and Meetup
to bring extant and new networks inside its
sphere of operations and thus provide them
with direction. As such, the campaign worked
toward creating and fostering a geographically
distributed community of bloggers, supporters,
volunteers, and funders that congregated at the
Web site and blog and monitored the activities
there. The aim was to ensure that supporters
could be routinely and quickly mobilized to
perform the fundraising and organizing tasks
that needed to be accomplished, often to attract
press coverage.
To implement this strategy, the campaign
recruited and hired a number of staffers for the
Internet Division who had technical expertise
from outside the political field and often in
commercial settings. Trippi (2004, p. 54) himself exemplified the way some of these staffers
bridged professional fields: he possessed nearly
three decades of experience running political
campaigns, in addition to having worked for a
number of Internet startups during the late
1990s that he referred to as “a few brash young
companies,” including Wave Systems, Smart
Paper Networks, and Progeny Linux Systems.
Trippi argued that this work shaped his understanding of how technology could be used in
electoral politics. He was joined on the
campaign by a number of individuals who possessed less extensive political experience, but
who shared knowledge and skills relating to the
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Kreiss
Internet that were then applied to a political
campaign. These resources were essentially
carried across contexts, a phenomenon that a
number of scholars have noted with respect to
social movement organizations (Gusfield,
1981; Staggenborg, 1988; Taylor, 1989).
On the one hand, this was reflected organizationally. For example, Bobby Clark (2007, p. 77),
an entrepreneur who worked on technology
startups in Colorado and California, was the
first Web strategist for the campaign and
recruited his former colleague, Dave Kochbeck,
to serve as the campaign’s first information
technology (IT) director. Clark describes how
Kochbeck’s commercial technology experience helped him understand the challenges of a
campaign, as he “served as our campaign’s
chief technology officer (CTO), as he had for
our San Francisco startup. . . .” (Clark, 2007,
p. 77). On the other, these professional and
technical skills helped shape the practices of the
campaign. Clay Johnson, a freelance technology consultant and lead programmer for Dean,
and Nicco Mele, the Webmaster for the campaign who had extensive experience in similar
positions with various progressive organizations, were both central figures who created the
campaign’s technical infrastructure. Staffers
within the Internet Division also included
Matthew Gross and Joe Rospars, both of whom
were bloggers prior to joining the campaign and
were instrumental in the launch and development
of Blog for America, the first blog hosted by a
presidential campaign. In characterizing their
approach to using the Internet in electoral politics, Zack Rosen (personal communication, April
7, 2008), a volunteer developer with Hack4Dean
who was hired as a staff member in late fall 2003,
described the Internet Division in new economy
terms as “feeling like a creative, creative project
rather than a managed organization.”
Professional backgrounds alone do not
explain the organizational and technical innovations of the Dean campaign, because a
number of candidates had Internet st …
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